Bios And Uefi Rootkit Detection System Project — Complete Documentation & Simulation

Overview & System Context

Bios And Uefi Rootkit Detection System Project: Comprehensive Web-Sourced Technical Investigation Exhaustive Research Dossier · Pure Web-Scraped Content: ~9033 Words · Real Software Screenshots: 3 1. Executive Overview & Technical Background Unified Extensible Firmware Interface or UEFI is a specification for the firmware architecture of a computing platform. When a computer is powered on, the UEFI implementation typically runs first, before the operating system or any other program is loaded. Examples include AMI Aptio, Phoenix SecureCore, TianoCore EDK II, and InsydeH2O. UEFI replaces the BIOS that was present in the boot ROM of all personal computers that are IBM PC compatible, although it can provide backwards compatibility with the BIOS using CSM booting. Unlike the BIOS, which was originally developed by IBM as a proprietary architecture, the UEFI specification is managed by an industry consortium. Most production firmware implementations for both remain proprietary. Intel developed the original Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) specification. The last Intel version of EFI was 1.10 released in 2005. Subsequent versions have been developed as UEFI by the UEFI Forum. UEFI is independent of platform and programming language, but C is used for the reference implementation TianoCore EDKII.

x86 (IA-32, x86-64) Itanium (IA-64) ARM (AArch32, AArch64) RISC-V (32-bit, 64-bit, 128-bit) LoongArch (32-bit, 64-bit) Unofficial UEFI support is under development for POWERPC64 by implementing TianoCore EDK II on top of OPAL, the OpenPOWER abstraction layer, running in little-endian mode. For MIPS, there also exists an unofficial project, based on the original EDK. However, both projects have since been abandoned as of November 2016 and September 2015 respectively.

UEFI only allows executing UEFI applications that match the firmware's bit-width, even if the processor supports smaller or larger bit-widths. For example, a 64-bit UEFI firmware may only execute 64-bit UEFI applications, even if the processor has a 32-bit processor mode. Some low-end computers have been shipped with 32-bit UEFI firmware running on 64-bit CPUs. Once a UEFI application ends the boot services, and gets granted full control over the system, it becomes possible to change the processor execution mode. However, calling runtime services requires shortly changing back to the original processor mode, as runtime services may only be called from the same processor mode as the firmware implementation. The Linux kernel added support for booting 64-bit kernels on 32-bit UEFI firmware implementations with x86-64 CPUs since version 3.15, requiring the UEFI boot loader to support the EFI handover protocol. The EFI handover protocol allows UEFI boot loaders to defer the UEFI initialization to the kernel's EFI boot stub, so that only the kernel does the UEFI initialization.

In addition to the standard PC disk partition scheme that uses a master boot record (MBR), UEFI also works with the GUID Partition Table (GPT) partitioning scheme, which is free from many of the limitations of MBR. In particular, the MBR limits on the number and size of disk partitions (up to four primary partitions per disk, and up to 2 TB (2 × 240 bytes) per disk) are relaxed. More specifically, GPT allows for a maximum disk and partition size of 8 ZiB (8 × 270 bytes) with 512 byte sectors.

The UEFI specification only supports FAT12/16/32 partitions that are on GPT or MBR disks as well as El Torito-formatted optical discs. Although GPT is a part of the UEFI standard, it may also be usable by BIOS PCs to boot an operating system off of. Support for GPT in Linux is enabled by turning on the option CONFIG_EFI_PARTITION (EFI GUID Partition Support) during kernel configuration. This option allows Linux to recognize and use GPT disks after the system firmware passes control over the system to Linux. For reverse compatibility, Linux can use GPT disks in BIOS-based systems for both data storage and booting, as both GRUB 2 and Linux are GPT-aware. Such a setup is usually referred to as BIOS-GPT. As GPT incorporates the protective MBR, a BIOS-based computer can boot from a GPT disk using a GPT-aware boot loader stored in the protective MBR's bootstrap code area. In the case of GRUB, such a configuration requires a BIOS boot partition for GRUB to embed its second-stage code due to absence of the post-MBR gap in GPT partitioned disks (which is taken over by the GPT's Primary Header and Primary Partition Table). Commonly 1 MB in size, this partition's Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) in GPT scheme is 21686148-6449-6E6F-744E-656564454649 and is used by GRUB only in BIOS-GPT setups. From GRUB's perspective, no such partition type exists in case of MBR partitioning. This partition is not required if the system is UEFI-based because no embedding of the second-stage code is needed in that case. UEFI systems can access GPT disks and boot directly from them, which allows Linux to use UEFI boot methods. Booting Linux from GPT disks on UEFI systems involves creation of an EFI system partition (ESP), which contains UEFI applications such as bootloaders, operating system kernels, and utility software. Such a setup is usually referred to as UEFI-GPT, while ESP is recommended to be at least 512 MB in size and formatted with a FAT32 filesystem for maximum compatibility. For backward compatibility, some UEFI implementations also support booting from MBR-partitioned disks through the Compatibility Support Module (CSM) that provides legacy BIOS compatibility. In that case, booting Linux on UEFI systems is the same as on legacy BIOS-based systems.

Figure 1: RootRepeal - Rootkit Detector - Screenshots Graphics Output Protocol (GOP) services The Graphics Output Protocol (GOP) provides runtime services; see also Graphics features section below. The operating system is permitted to directly write to the framebuffer and BLT provided by GOP during runtime mode. UEFI memory map services This boot service allows the bootloader to obtain information on how the memory is laid out. SMM services The SMM ("ring -2") is an x86 mode that provides secure code execution isolated from all lower rings. Modern UEFI generalizes the concept to Management Mode (MM) to also encompass alternative technologoies such as TrustZone. One common use of the MM/SMM services is as a secure store of variables. ACPI services SMBIOS services Devicetree services (for RISC processors) These runtime services allow the operating system to obtain information about the installed hardware and how to make use of them. Variable services UEFI variables store non-volatile data. The variable storage is conceptually divided into namespaces identified by GUIDs. Each namespace can contain any number of variable entries, which are key/value pairs (Unicode string key, variable-length byte-array value). Each entry also carries an attributes bitfield, which can restrict its access to only boot or run-time (among other, more advanced, uses). Some UEFI variables are shared between platform firmware and operating systems. For example, the OS may set the BootOrder and Boot#### variables under the EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE namespace to influence the UEFI boot manager's future choices. Other variables may be private to one side. For example, UEFI variables can be used by an OS to keep crash messages in NVRAM after a crash for the operating system to retrieve after a reboot. Time services UEFI provides time services. Time services include support for time zone and daylight saving fields, which allow the hardware real-time clock to be set to local time or UTC. On machines using a PC-AT real-time clock, Microsoft Windows does not use the EFI time zone and DST fields, and expects the hardware clock to provide local time like traditional BIOS-based Windows did. As a result the HW clock cannot be set to UTC unless using recent versions and an entry in the Windows registry is set to indicate the use of UTC.

UEFI executes independent programs known as UEFI applications, which are stored as files on the EFI system partition. These can be launched by the firmware boot manager or other UEFI applications. They may be developed independently of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). A type of UEFI application is an OS boot loader such as GRUB, rEFInd, systemd-boot, and Windows Boot Manager, which loads some OS files into memory and executes them. The UEFI Shell is an example of a UEFI application that launches other UEFI applications. Some OS loaders do the same, providing a user interface to allow the selection of another UEFI application to run.

An EFI system partition, often abbreviated to ESP, is a data storage device partition that is used in computers adhering to the UEFI specification. Accessed by the UEFI firmware when a computer is powered up, it stores UEFI applications and the files these applications need to run, including operating system boot loaders. Supported partition table schemes include MBR and GPT, as well as El Torito volumes on optical discs. For use on ESPs, UEFI defines a specific version of the FAT file system, which is maintained as part of the UEFI specification and independently from the original FAT specification, encompassing the FAT32, FAT16 and FAT12 file systems. The ESP retains the BIOS-style boot sector from FAT, though this is not used by UEFI.

Booting UEFI systems from GPT-partitioned disks is commonly called UEFI-GPT booting. The alternative is to boot from an EFI System Partition on MBR-partitioned disks, commonly called UEFI-MBR. UEFI-MBR capability is required by the UEFI specification, but some UEFI firmware implementations immediately switch to BIOS-based CSM booting depending on the type of the boot disk's partition table, effectively preventing it from occurring. It is also common for a boot manager to have a textual user interface to allow the user to select the desired OS (or setup utility) from a list of available boot options. On PC platforms, firmware supporting UEFI boot is often referred to as a "UEFI BIOS", though some newer x86 platforms exclude CSM support entirely.

Figure 2: Itt az elsI éles UEFI rootkit - Antivírus blog 2. System Architecture & Core Working Principles The UEFI specification defines a Secure Boot that can secure the boot process by preventing the loading of UEFI drivers or OS boot loaders that are not signed with an acceptable digital signature. When Secure Boot is enabled, it is initially placed in "setup" mode, which allows a public key known as the "platform key" (PK) to be written to the firmware. Once the key is written, Secure Boot enters "User" mode, where only UEFI drivers and OS boot loaders signed with the platform key can be loaded by the firmware. Additional "key exchange keys" (KEK) can be added to a database stored in memory to allow other certificates to be used, but they must still have a connection to the private portion of the platform key. Secure Boot can also be placed in "Custom" mode, where additional public keys can be added to the system that do not match the private key. Secure Boot is supported by Windows 8 and 8.1, Windows Server 2012 and 2012 R2, Windows 10, Windows Server 2016, 2019, and 2022, and Windows 11, VMware vSphere 6.5 and several Linux distributions including Fedora (since version 18), openSUSE (since version 12.3), RHEL (since version 7), CentOS (since version 7), Debian (since version 10), Ubuntu (since version 12.04.2), Linux Mint (since version 21.3), and AlmaLinux OS (since version 8.4). As of January 2025, FreeBSD support is in its planning stage.

The UEFI standards include a specification for a shell environment. The shell is a UEFI application that can be used to execute other UEFI applications, including UEFI boot loaders. It also includes built-in commands for obtaining various other information about the system or the firmware, including getting the memory map (memmap), modifying boot manager variables (bcfg), running partitioning programs (diskpart), loading UEFI drivers, and editing text files (edit). It implements a scripting language with support for if-statements, for-loops, and environment variables. The UEFI shell is not a mandatory component of the firmware. It tends to be pre-loaded into server motherboards, which allows it to be launched by appropriate key press combinations. Some other motherboards provide a direct option in firmware setup for launching, e.g. compiled x86-64 version of the shell needs to be made available as /SHELLX64.EFI. For other systems, the solution is either creating an appropriate USB flash drive (as BOOTxxxx.efi, making use of boot loader auto-detection) or adding manually (bcfg) a boot option associated with the compiled version of shell. Source code for a UEFI shell can be downloaded from the Intel's TianoCore UDK/EDK2 project. A pre-built ShellBinPkg is also available. Shell v2 works best in UEFI 2.3+ systems and is recommended over Shell v1 in those systems. Shell v1 should work in all UEFI systems.

The shell v2 includes a much broader set of features in its default build. For example, there is a new devtree for showing a tree of devices. Class 0: Legacy BIOS Class 1: UEFI with a CSM interface and no external UEFI interface. The only UEFI interfaces are internal to the firmware. Class 2: UEFI with CSM and external UEFI interfaces, e.g. UEFI Boot. Class 3: UEFI without a CSM interface and with an external UEFI interface. Class 3+: UEFI class 3 that has Secure Boot enabled. Starting from the 10th Gen Intel Core, Intel no longer provides Legacy Video BIOS for the iGPU (Intel Graphics Technology). Legacy boot with those CPUs requires a Legacy Video BIOS, which can still be provided by a video card.

Figure 3: What is the UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface)? - IONOS CA Successful dispatching of PEIMs (pre-EFI initialization modules). Initializing permanent memory (RAM). Handing over to the next stage, DXE. Facilitating the communication of PEIMs called PPI. Intel's implementation of EFI is the Intel Platform Innovation Framework, codenamed Tiano. Tiano runs on Intel's XScale, Itanium, IA-32 and x86-64 processors, and is proprietary software, although a portion of the code has been released under the BSD license or Eclipse Public License (EPL) as TianoCore EDK II. TianoCore can be used as a payload for coreboot. Phoenix Technologies' implementation of UEFI is branded as SecureCore Technology (SCT). American Megatrends offers its own UEFI firmware implementation known as Aptio, while Insyde Software offers InsydeH2O, and Byosoft offers ByoCore. In December 2018, Microsoft released an open source version of its TianoCore EDK2-based UEFI implementation from the Surface line, Project Mu. An implementation of the UEFI API was introduced into the Universal Boot Loader (Das U-Boot) in 2017. On the ARMv8 architecture Linux distributions use the U-Boot UEFI implementation in conjunction with GNU GRUB for booting (e.g. SUSE Linux), the same holds true for OpenBSD. For booting from iSCSI iPXE can be used as a UEFI application loaded by U-Boot.

Intel's first Itanium workstations and servers, released in 2000, implemented EFI 1.02. Hewlett-Packard's first Itanium 2 systems, released in 2002, implemented EFI 1.10. These systems were able to boot Windows, Linux, FreeBSD and HP-UX. OpenVMS added UEFI capability in June 2003. In January 2006, Apple Inc. shipped its first Intel-based Macintosh computers. These systems used EFI instead of Open Firmware, which had been used on its previous PowerPC-based systems. On 5 April 2006, Apple first released Boot Camp, which produces a Windows drivers disk and a non-destructive partitioning tool to allow the installation of Windows XP or Vista without requiring a reinstallation of Mac OS X (now macOS). A firmware update was also released that added BIOS compatibility to its EFI implementation. Subsequent Macintosh models shipped with the newer firmware. During 2005, more than one million Intel systems shipped with Intel's implementation of UEFI. New mobile, desktop and server products, using Intel's implementation of UEFI, started shipping in 2006. For instance, boards that use the Intel 945 chipset series use Intel's UEFI firmware implementation. Since 2005, EFI has also been implemented on non-PC architectures, such as embedded systems based on XScale cores. The EDK (EFI Developer Kit) includes an NT32 target, which allows EFI firmware and EFI applications to run within a Windows application. However, no direct hardware access is allowed by EDK NT32. This means only a subset of EFI application and drivers can be executed by the EDK NT32 target. In 2008, more x86-64 systems adopted UEFI. While many of these systems still allow booting only the BIOS-based OSes via the Compatibility Support Module (CSM) (thus not appearing to the user to be UEFI-based), other systems started to allow booting UEFI-based OSes. For example, IBM x3450 server, MSI motherboards with ClickBIOS and HP EliteBook Notebook PCs. In 2009, IBM shipped System x machines (x3550 M2, x3650 M2, iDataPlex dx360 M2) and BladeCenter HS22 with UEFI capability. Dell shipped PowerEdge T610, R610, R710, M610 and M710 servers with UEFI capability. More commercially available systems are mentioned in a UEFI whitepaper. In 2011, major vendors (such as ASRock, Asus, Gigabyte, and MSI) launched several consumer-oriented motherboards using the Intel 6-series LGA 1155 chipset and AMD 9 Series AM3+ chipsets with UEFI. With the release of Windows 8 in October 2012, Microsoft's certification requirements now require that computers include firmware that implements the UEFI specification. Furthermore, if the computer supports the "Connected Standby" feature of Windows 8 (which allows devices to have power management comparable to smartphones, with an almost instantaneous return from standby mode), then the firmware is not permitted to contain a Compatibility Support Module (CSM). As such, systems that support Connected Standby are incapable of booting Legacy BIOS operating systems. In October 2017, Intel announced that it would remove legacy PC BIOS support from all its products by 2020, in favor of UEFI Class 3. By 2019, all computers based on Intel platforms no longer have legacy PC BIOS support.

The Linux kernel has been able to use EFI at boot time since the early 2000s, using the elilo EFI boot loader and more recently, EFI versions of GRUB or systemd-boot. Grub+Linux also supports booting from a GUID partition table without UEFI. The distribution Ubuntu added support for UEFI Secure Boot as of version 12.10. The Linux kernel can be compiled with the option to run as an EFI bootloader on its own through the EFI boot stub feature. In the Linux kernel, either the ACPI protocol (usually used on PC-compatible machines) or the DeviceTree protocol (usually used on smartphones and tablet computers) can be used with UEFI. HP-UX has used (U)EFI as its boot mechanism on IA-64 systems since 2002. OpenVMS has used EFI on IA-64 since its initial evaluation release in December 2003, and for production releases since January 2005. OpenVMS on x86-64 also uses UEFI to boot the operating system. Apple uses EFI for its line of Intel-based Macs. Mac OS X v10.4 Tiger and Mac OS X v10.5 Leopard implements EFI v1.10 in 32-bit mode even on 64-bit CPUs, but full support arrived with OS X v10.8 Mountain Lion. Windows XP 64-bit Edition and Windows Server 2003 for IA-64, all of which are for the Intel Itanium family of processors, implement EFI, a requirement of the platform through the DIG64 specification. The pre-release versions of Windows Server 2003 for 64-bit Itanium systems (Windows Advanced Server Limited Edition and Windows Datacenter Server Limited Edition, which were labeled as 64-bit versions of Windows 2000 for the time being) implemented EFI 1.10 in 2002. Microsoft introduced UEFI for x86-64 Windows operating systems beginning with Windows Vista SP1 and Windows Server 2008, however only UGA (Universal Graphic Adapter) 1.1 or Legacy BIOS INT 10h is supported; Graphics Output Protocol (GOP) is not supported. Therefore, PCs running 64-bit versions of Windows Vista SP1 and SP2, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2 are compatible with UEFI Class 2. 32-bit UEFI was originally not supported since vendors did not have any interest in producing native 32-bit UEFI firmware because of the mainstream status of 64-bit computing. Windows 8 finally introduced further optimizations for UEFI systems, including Graphics Output Protocol (GOP) support, a faster startup, 32-bit UEFI support, and Secure Boot support. Since Windows 8, the UEFI firmware with ACPI protocol is a mandatory requirement for ARM-based Microsoft Windows operating systems. Microsoft began requiring UEFI to run Windows starting with Windows 11, with the exception of IoT Enterprise editions of Windows 11 since version 24H2. On 5 March 2013, the FreeBSD Foundation awarded a grant to a developer seeking to add UEFI support to the FreeBSD kernel and bootloader. The changes were initially stored in a discrete branch of the FreeBSD source code, but were merged into the mainline source on 4 April 2014 (revision 264095); the changes include support in the installer as well. UEFI boot support for amd64 first appeared in FreeBSD 10.1 and for arm64 in FreeBSD 11.0. NetBSD supports UEFI since version 8.0 for i386 and amd64 architectures as well as on various ARM platforms since version 9.0. Oracle Solaris 11.1 and later support UEFI boot for x86 systems with UEFI firmware version 2.1 or later. GRUB 2 is used as the boot loader on x86.

OpenBSD 5.9 introduced UEFI boot support for 64-bit x86 systems using its own custom loader, OpenBSD 6.0 extended that support to include ARMv7. illumos added basic UEFI support in October 2017. ArcaOS supports UEFI booting since the 5.1 release. ArcaOS' UEFI support emulates specific BIOS functionality which the operating system depends on (particularly interrupts INT 10H and INT 13H).

3. Software Implementation, Frameworks & Protocols In 2011, Microsoft announced that computers certified to run its Windows 8 operating system had to ship with Microsoft's public key enrolled and Secure Boot enabled, which implies that using UEFI is a requirement for these devices. Following the announcement, critics and free-software/open-source advocates, including the Free Software Foundation, expressed concern that Microsoft might use the Secure Boot functionality of UEFI to restrict the installation of alternative operating systems such as Linux. Microsoft denied that the Secure Boot requirement was intended to serve as a form of lock-in and clarified its requirements by stating that x86-based systems certified for Windows 8 must allow Secure Boot to enter custom mode or be disabled, but not on systems using the ARM architecture. Windows 10 allows OEMs to decide whether or not Secure Boot can be managed by users of their x86 systems. Other developers raised concerns about the legal and practical issues of implementing support for Secure Boot on Linux systems in general. Former Red Hat developer Matthew Garrett noted that conditions in the GNU General Public License version 3 may prevent the use of the GNU GRand Unified Bootloader without a distribution's developer disclosing the private key (however, the Free Software Foundation has since clarified its position, assuring that the responsibility to make keys available was held by the hardware manufacturer), and that it would also be difficult for advanced users to build custom kernels that could function with Secure Boot enabled without self-signing them.

Other developers suggested that signed builds of Linux with another key could be provided, but noted that it would be difficult to persuade OEMs to ship their computers with the required key alongside the Microsoft key. Several major Linux distributions have developed different implementations for Secure Boot. Garrett himself developed a minimal bootloader known as a shim, which is a precompiled, signed bootloader that allows the user to individually trust keys provided by Linux distributions. Ubuntu 12.10 uses an older version of shim pre-configured for use with Canonical's own key that verifies only the bootloader and allows unsigned kernels to be loaded; developers believed that the practice of signing only the bootloader is more feasible, since a trusted kernel is effective at securing only the user space, and not the pre-boot state for which Secure Boot is designed to add protection. That also allows users to build their own kernels and use custom kernel modules as well, without the need to reconfigure the system. Canonical also maintains its own private key to sign installations of Ubuntu pre-loaded on certified OEM computers that run the operating system, and also plans to enforce a Secure Boot requirement as well—requiring both a Canonical key and a Microsoft key (for compatibility reasons) to be included in their firmware. Fedora also uses shim, but requires that both the kernel and its modules be signed as well. shim has Machine Owner Key (MOK) that can be used to sign locally compiled kernels and other software not signed by distribution maintainer, without changing the Secure Boot mode to setup mode. It has been disputed whether the operating-system kernel and its modules must be signed as well; while the UEFI specifications do not require it, Microsoft has asserted that their contractual requirements do, and that it reserves the right to revoke any certificates used to sign code that can be used to compromise the security of the system. In Windows, if Secure Boot is enabled, all kernel drivers must be digitally signed; non-WHQL drivers may be refused to load. In February 2013, another Red Hat developer attempted to submit a patch to the Linux kernel that would allow it to parse Microsoft's authenticode signing using a master X.509 key embedded in PE files signed by Microsoft. However, the proposal was criticized by Linux creator Linus Torvalds, who argued that Red Hat was accommodating Microsoft's control over the Secure Boot infrastructure. On 26 March 2013, the Spanish free-software development group Hispalinux filed a formal complaint with the European Commission, contending that Microsoft's Secure Boot requirements on OEM systems were "obstructive" and anti-competitive. At the Black Hat conference in August 2013, a group of security researchers presented a series of exploits in specific vendor implementations of UEFI that could be used to exploit Secure Boot. In August 2016 it was reported that two security researchers had found the "golden key" security key Microsoft uses in signing operating systems. Technically, no key was exposed, but an exploitable binary signed by the key was. This allows software to execute as though it were signed by Microsoft, presenting potential risks for rootkit and bootkit attacks. This also complicates remediation efforts, since a patch can potentially be downgraded by replacing it with the signed exploitable binary. Microsoft stated that the vulnerability only affects ARM architecture and Windows RT devices and released two updates; however, reports noted that these updates do not completely prevent exploitation because fully resolving the vulnerability would require key replacements in end-user firmware. On 1 March 2023, researchers from ESET reported discovering "BlackLotus", described as the first active UEFI bootkit capable of bypassing UEFI Secure Boot by exploiting the limitations of the previous security updates.

In August 2024, the Windows 11 and Windows 10 security updates applied the Secure Boot Advanced Targeting (SBAT) settings to device's UEFI NVRAM, which caused some Linux distributions to fail to load. SBAT is a protocol that supported in new versions of Windows Boot Manager and shim, which refuse buggy or vulnerable intermediate bootloaders (usually older versions of Windows Boot Manager and GRUB) to load in the boot process. The change was reverted the next month. In June 2025, LWN.net reported that the Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 certificate will be expired on June 24, 2026, which may refuse some Linux to load if Secure Boot is enabled. However, in TianoCore EDK II as well as many commercial UEFI implementations (such as AMI Aptio), time/date check for Secure Boot certificate is usually disabled by default. Many Linux distributions support UEFI Secure Boot as of January 2025, such as RHEL (RHEL 7 and later), CentOS (CentOS 7 and later), Ubuntu, Fedora, Debian (Debian 10 and later), OpenSUSE, and SUSE Linux Enterprise.

Official website UEFI Specifications Intel-sponsored open-source EFI Framework initiative Intel EFI/UEFI portal Microsoft UEFI Support and Requirements for Windows Operating Systems How Windows 8 Hybrid Shutdown / Fast Boot feature works Securing the Windows 10 Boot Process LoJax: First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit group Python Interpreter for UEFI Shell A rootkit is a collection of typically malicious computer software designed to enable access to a computer or to part of its software that would not otherwise be allowed (for example, by an unauthorized user). Rootkits often mask their presence or that of other software. The term rootkit is a compound of "root" (the traditional name of the privileged account on Unix-like operating systems) and the word "kit" (which refers to the software components that implement the tool). The term "rootkit" has negative connotations through its association with malware. Rootkit installation can be automated, or an attacker can install a rootkit after having obtained root or administrator access. Obtaining this access is a result of a direct attack on a system, i.e., exploiting a vulnerability (such as privilege escalation) or a password (obtained by cracking or social engineering tactics like "phishing"). Once installed, it becomes possible to hide the intrusion as well as to maintain privileged access. Full control over a system means that existing software can be modified, including software that might otherwise be used to detect or circumvent it. Rootkit detection is difficult because a rootkit may be able to subvert the software that is intended to find it.

Detection methods include using an alternative and trusted operating system, behavior-based methods, signature scanning, difference scanning, and memory dump analysis. Removal can be complicated, especially in cases where the rootkit resides in the kernel; reinstallation of the operating system may be the only available solution to the problem. When dealing with firmware rootkits, removal may require hardware replacement, or specialized equipment.

Stuxnet, uncovered in 2010, was a highly sophisticated worm widely believed to have been developed in a joint U.S.–Israeli intelligence operation targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities. It notably included a Windows kernel-mode rootkit that concealed the malware’s files and processes, enabling the worm to silently sabotage industrial control systems. Stuxnet is often cited as the first known cyberweapon; it destroyed a significant part of Iran’s uranium centrifuges, while remaining difficult to detect.

In 2005, Sony BMG published CDs with copy protection and digital rights management software called Extended Copy Protection, created by software company First 4 Internet. The software included a music player but silently installed a rootkit which limited the user's ability to access the CD. Software engineer Mark Russinovich, who created the rootkit detection tool RootkitRevealer, discovered the rootkit on one of his computers. The ensuing scandal raised the public's awareness of rootkits. To cloak itself, the rootkit hid any file starting with "$sys$" from the user. Soon after Russinovich's report, malware appeared which took advantage of the existing rootkit on affected systems. One BBC analyst called it a "public relations nightmare." Sony BMG released patches to uninstall the rootkit, which exposed users to an even more serious vulnerability.

The company eventually recalled the CDs. In the United States, a class-action lawsuit was brought against Sony BMG. The 2004–2005 Greek wiretapping case, also referred to as Greek Watergate, involved the illegal telephone tapping of more than 100 mobile phones on the Vodafone Greece network belonging mostly to members of the Greek government and top-ranking civil servants. The taps began sometime near the beginning of August 2004 and were removed in March 2005 without discovering the identity of the perpetrators. The intruders installed a rootkit targeting Ericsson's AXE telephone exchange. According to IEEE Spectrum, this was "the first time a rootkit has been observed on a special-purpose system, in this case an Ericsson telephone switch." The rootkit was designed to patch the memory of the exchange while it was running, enable wiretapping while disabling audit logs, patch the commands that list active processes and active data blocks, and modify the data block checksum verification command. A "backdoor" allowed an operator with sysadmin status to deactivate the exchange's transaction log, alarms and access commands related to the surveillance capability. The rootkit was discovered after the intruders installed a faulty update, which caused SMS texts to be undelivered, leading to an automated failure report being generated. Ericsson engineers were called in to investigate the fault and discovered the hidden data blocks containing the list of phone numbers being monitored, along with the rootkit and illicit monitoring software.

4. Practical Deployment, Analysis & Case Studies Provide an attacker with full access via a backdoor, permitting unauthorized access to, for example, steal or falsify documents. One of the ways to carry this out is to subvert the login mechanism, such as the /bin/login program on Unix-like systems or GINA on Windows. The replacement appears to function normally, but also accepts a secret login combination that allows an attacker direct access to the system with administrative privileges, bypassing standard authentication and authorization mechanisms. Conceal other malware, notably password-stealing key loggers and computer viruses. Appropriate the compromised machine as a zombie computer for attacks on other computers. (The attack originates from the compromised system or network, instead of the attacker's system.) "Zombie" computers are typically members of large botnets that can–amongst other things–launch denial-of-service attacks, distribute email spam, and conduct click fraud. In some instances, rootkits provide desired functionality, and may be installed intentionally on behalf of the computer user: Detect attacks, for example, in a honeypot. Enhance emulation software and security software. Alcohol 120% and Daemon Tools are commercial examples of non-hostile rootkits used to defeat copy-protection mechanisms such as SafeDisc and SecuROM. Kaspersky antivirus software also uses techniques resembling rootkits to protect itself from malicious actions. It loads its own drivers to intercept system activity, and then prevents other processes from doing harm to itself. Its processes are not hidden, but cannot be terminated by standard methods. Anti-theft protection: Laptops may have BIOS-based rootkit software that will periodically report to a central authority, allowing the laptop to be monitored, disabled or wiped of information in the event that it is stolen. Bypassing Microsoft Product Activation There are at least five types of rootkit, ranging from those at the lowest level in firmware (with the highest privileges), through to the least privileged user-based variants that operate in Ring 3. Hybrid combinations of these may occur spanning, for example, user mode and kernel mode.

User-mode rootkits run in Ring 3, along with other applications as user, rather than low-level system processes. They have a number of possible installation vectors to intercept and modify the standard behavior of application programming interfaces (APIs). Some inject a dynamically linked library (such as a .DLL file on Windows, or a .dylib file on Mac OS X) into other processes, and are thereby able to execute inside any target process to spoof it; others with sufficient privileges simply overwrite the memory of a target application. Injection mechanisms include: Use of vendor-supplied application extensions. For example, Windows Explorer has public interfaces that allow third parties to extend its functionality. Interception of messages. Debuggers. Exploitation of security vulnerabilities. Function hooking or patching of commonly used APIs, for example, to hide a running process or file that resides on a filesystem. ...since user mode applications all run in their own memory space, the rootkit needs to perform this patching in the memory space of every running application. In addition, the rootkit needs to monitor the system for any new applications that execute and patch those programs' memory space before they fully execute.

Code signing uses public-key infrastructure to check if a file has been modified since being digitally signed by its publisher. Alternatively, a system owner or administrator can use a cryptographic hash function to compute a "fingerprint" at installation time that can help to detect subsequent unauthorized changes to on-disk code libraries. However, unsophisticated schemes check only whether the code has been modified since installation time; subversion prior to that time is not detectable. The fingerprint must be re-established each time changes are made to the system: for example, after installing security updates or a service pack. The hash function creates a message digest, a relatively short code calculated from each bit in the file using an algorithm that creates large changes in the message digest with even smaller changes to the original file. By recalculating and comparing the message digest of the installed files at regular intervals against a trusted list of message digests, changes in the system can be detected and monitored—as long as the original baseline was created before the malware was added.

More-sophisticated rootkits are able to subvert the verification process by presenting an unmodified copy of the file for inspection, or by making code modifications only in memory, reconfiguration registers, which are later compared to a white list of expected values. The code that performs hash, compare, or extend operations must also be protected—in this context, the notion of an immutable root-of-trust holds that the very first code to measure security properties of a system must itself be trusted to ensure that a rootkit or bootkit does not compromise the system at its most fundamental level.

In computing, BIOS or the Basic Input/Output System is a type of firmware used to provide runtime services for operating systems and programs and to perform hardware initialization during the booting process (power-on startup). On a computer using BIOS firmware, the firmware comes pre-installed on the computer's motherboard. The name originates from the Basic Input/Output System used in the CP/M operating system in 1975. The BIOS firmware was originally proprietary to the IBM PC; it was reverse engineered by some companies, such as Compaq, Phoenix Technologies, AMI and others, looking to create compatible systems. The interface of that original system serves as a de facto standard. The BIOS in older PCs initializes and tests the system hardware components (power-on self-test or POST for short), and loads a boot loader from a mass storage device which then initializes a kernel. In the era of DOS, the BIOS provided BIOS interrupt calls for the keyboard, display, storage, and other input/output (I/O) devices that standardized an interface to application programs and the operating system.

More recent operating systems do not use the BIOS interrupt calls after startup. Most BIOS implementations are specifically designed to work with a particular computer or motherboard model, by interfacing with various devices especially system chipset. Originally, BIOS firmware was stored in a ROM chip on the PC motherboard. In later computer systems, the BIOS contents are stored on flash memory so it can be rewritten without removing the chip from the motherboard. This allows easy, end-user updates to the BIOS firmware so new features can be added or bugs can be fixed, but it also creates a possibility for the computer to become infected with BIOS rootkits. Furthermore, a BIOS upgrade that fails could brick the motherboard.

Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) is a successor to the legacy PC BIOS, aiming to address its technical limitations. UEFI firmware may include legacy BIOS compatibility to maintain compatibility with operating systems and option cards that do not support UEFI native operation. Intel phased out providing support for booting from the BIOS interface from 2020 to 2024 depending on the platform. The last version of Microsoft Windows to officially support running on PCs which use legacy BIOS firmware is Windows 10 as Windows 11 requires a UEFI-compliant system (except for IoT Enterprise editions of Windows 11 since version 24H2).

The term BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) was created by Gary Kildall and first appeared in the CP/M operating system in 1975, describing the machine-specific part of CP/M loaded during boot time that interfaces directly with the hardware. (A CP/M machine usually has only a simple boot loader in its ROM.) Versions of MS-DOS, PC DOS or DR-DOS contain a file called variously "IO.SYS", "IBMBIO.COM", "IBMBIO.SYS", or "DRBIOS.SYS"; this file is known as the "DOS BIOS" (also known as the "DOS I/O System") and contains the lower-level hardware-specific part of the operating system. Together with the underlying hardware-specific but operating system-independent "System BIOS", which resides in ROM, it represents the analogue to the "CP/M BIOS". The BIOS originally proprietary to the IBM PC has been reverse engineered by some companies, such as Compaq, Phoenix Technologies, AMI and others, looking to create compatible systems. With the introduction of PS/2 machines, IBM divided the System BIOS into real- and protected-mode portions. The real-mode portion was meant to provide backward compatibility with existing operating systems such as DOS, and therefore was named "CBIOS" (for "Compatibility BIOS"), whereas the "ABIOS" (for "Advanced BIOS") provided new interfaces specifically suited for multitasking operating systems such as OS/2.

5. Performance Evaluation & Extended Technical Observations Peripheral cards such as hard disk drive host bus adapters and video cards have their own firmware, and BIOS extension option ROM code may be a part of the expansion card firmware; that code provides additional capabilities in the BIOS. Code in option ROMs runs before the BIOS boots the operating system from mass storage. These ROMs typically test and initialize hardware, add new BIOS services, or replace existing BIOS services with their own services. For example, a SCSI controller usually has a BIOS extension ROM that adds support for hard drives connected through that controller. An extension ROM could in principle contain operating system, or it could implement an entirely different boot process such as network booting.

Operation of an IBM-compatible computer system can be completely changed by removing or inserting an adapter card (or a ROM chip) that contains a BIOS extension ROM. The motherboard BIOS typically contains code for initializing and bootstrapping integrated display and integrated storage. The initialization process can involve the execution of code related to the device being initialized, for locating the device, verifying the type of device, then establishing base registers, setting pointers, establishing interrupt vector tables, selecting paging modes which are ways for organizing available registers in devices, setting default values for accessing software routines related to interrupts, and setting the device's configuration using default values. In addition, plug-in adapter cards such as SCSI, RAID, network interface cards, and video cards often include their own BIOS (e.g., Video BIOS), complementing or replacing the system BIOS code for the given component. Even devices built into the motherboard can behave in this way; their option ROMs can be a part of the motherboard BIOS. An add-in card requires an option ROM if the card is not supported by the motherboard BIOS and the card needs to be initialized or made accessible through BIOS services before the operating system can be loaded (usually this means it is required in the boot process). An additional advantage of ROM on some early PC systems (notably including the IBM PCjr) was that ROM was faster than main system RAM. (On modern systems, the case is very much the reverse of this, and BIOS ROM code is usually copied ("shadowed") into RAM so it will run faster.) Option ROMs normally reside on adapter cards. However, the original PC, and perhaps also the PC XT, have a spare ROM socket on the motherboard (the "system board" in IBM's terms) into which an option ROM can be inserted, and the four ROMs that contain the BASIC interpreter can also be removed and replaced with custom ROMs which can be option ROMs. The IBM PCjr is unique among PCs in having two ROM cartridge slots on the front. Cartridges in these slots map into the same region of the upper memory area used for option ROMs, and the cartridges can contain option ROM modules that the BIOS would recognize. The cartridges can also contain other types of ROM modules, such as BASIC programs, that are handled differently. One PCjr cartridge can contain several ROM modules of different types, possibly stored together in one ROM chip.

After the POST completes and, in a BIOS that supports option ROMs, after the option ROM scan is completed and all detected ROM modules with valid checksums have been called, the BIOS calls interrupt 19h to start boot processing. Post-boot, programs loaded can also call interrupt 19h to reboot the system, but they must be careful to disable interrupts and other asynchronous hardware processes that may interfere with the BIOS rebooting process, or else the system may hang or crash while it is rebooting. When interrupt 19h is called, the BIOS attempts to locate boot loader software on a "boot device", such as a hard disk, a floppy disk, CD, or DVD. It loads and executes the first boot software it finds, giving it control of the PC.

The BIOS uses the boot devices set in Nonvolatile BIOS memory (CMOS), or, in the earliest PCs, DIP switches. The BIOS checks each device in order to see if it is bootable by attempting to load the first sector (boot sector). If the sector cannot be read, the BIOS proceeds to the next device. If the sector is read successfully, some BIOSes will also check for the boot sector signature 0x55 0xAA in the last two bytes of the sector (which is 512 bytes long), before accepting a boot sector and considering the device bootable. When a bootable device is found, the BIOS transfers control to the loaded sector. The BIOS does not interpret the contents of the boot sector other than to possibly check for the boot sector signature in the last two bytes. Interpretation of data structures like partition tables and BIOS Parameter Blocks is done by the boot program in the boot sector itself or by other programs loaded through the boot process. A non-disk device such as a network adapter attempts booting by a procedure that is defined by its option ROM or the equivalent integrated into the motherboard BIOS ROM. As such, option ROMs may also influence or supplant the boot process defined by the motherboard BIOS ROM. With the El Torito optical media boot standard, the optical drive actually emulates a 3.5" high-density floppy disk to the BIOS for boot purposes. Reading the "first sector" of a CD-ROM or DVD-ROM is not a simply defined operation like it is on a floppy disk or a hard disk. Furthermore, the complexity of the medium makes it difficult to write a useful boot program in one sector. The bootable virtual floppy disk can contain software that provides access to the optical medium in its native format. If an expansion ROM wishes to change the way the system boots (such as from a network device or a SCSI adapter) in a cooperative way, it can use the BIOS Boot Specification (BBS) API to register its ability to do so. Once the expansion ROMs have registered using the BBS APIs, the user can select among the available boot options from within the BIOS's user interface. This is why most BBS compliant PC BIOS implementations will not allow the user to enter the BIOS's user interface until the expansion ROMs have finished executing and registering themselves with the BBS API. Also, if an expansion ROM wishes to change the way the system boots unilaterally, it can simply hook interrupt 19h or other interrupts normally called from interrupt 19h, such as interrupt 13h, the BIOS disk service, to intercept the BIOS boot process. Then it can replace the BIOS boot process with one of its own, or it can merely modify the boot sequence by inserting its own boot actions into it, by preventing the BIOS from detecting certain devices as bootable, or both. Before the BIOS Boot Specification was promulgated, this was the only way for expansion ROMs to implement boot capability for devices not supported for booting by the native BIOS of the motherboard.

A modern BIOS setup utility has a text user interface (TUI) or graphical user interface (GUI) accessed by pressing a certain key on the keyboard when the PC starts. Usually, the key is advertised for short time during the early startup, for example "Press DEL to enter Setup". The actual key depends on specific hardware. The settings key is most often Delete (Acer, ASRock, Asus PC, ECS, Gigabyte, MSI, Zotac) and F2 (Asus motherboard, Dell, Lenovo laptop, Origin PC, Samsung, Toshiba), but it can also be F1 (Lenovo desktop) and F10 (HP). Features present in the BIOS setup utility typically include: Configuring, enabling and disabling the hardware components Setting the system time Setting the boot order Setting various passwords, such as a password for securing access to the BIOS user interface and preventing malicious users from booting the system from unauthorized portable storage devices, or a password for booting the system A modern BIOS setup screen often features a PC Health Status or a Hardware Monitoring tab, which directly interfaces with a Hardware Monitor chip of the mainboard. This makes it possible to monitor CPU and chassis temperature, the voltage provided by the power supply unit, as well as monitor and control the speed of the fans connected to the motherboard. Once the system is booted, hardware monitoring and computer fan control is normally done directly by the Hardware Monitor chip itself, which can be a separate chip, interfaced through I²C or SMBus, or come as a part of a Super I/O solution, interfaced through Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) or Low Pin Count (LPC). Some operating systems, like NetBSD with envsys and OpenBSD with sysctl hw.sensors, feature integrated interfacing with hardware monitors. However, in some circumstances, the BIOS also provides the underlying information about hardware monitoring through ACPI, in which case, the operating system may be using ACPI to perform hardware monitoring.

In modern PCs the BIOS is stored in rewritable EEPROM or NOR flash memory, allowing the contents to be replaced and modified. This rewriting of the contents is sometimes termed flashing. It can be done by a special program, usually provided by the system's manufacturer, or at POST, with a BIOS image in a hard drive or USB flash drive. A file containing such contents is sometimes termed "a BIOS image". A BIOS might be reflashed in order to upgrade to a newer version to fix bugs or provide improved performance or to support newer hardware. Some computers also support updating the BIOS via an update floppy disk or a special partition on the hard drive.

The original IBM PC BIOS (and cassette BASIC) was stored on mask-programmed read-only memory (ROM) chips in sockets on the motherboard. ROMs could be replaced, but not altered, by users. To allow for updates, many compatible computers used re-programmable BIOS memory devices such as EPROM, EEPROM and later flash memory (usually NOR flash) devices. According to Robert Braver, the president of the BIOS manufacturer Micro Firmware, Flash BIOS chips became common around 1995 because the electrically erasable PROM (EEPROM) chips are cheaper and easier to program than standard ultraviolet erasable PROM (EPROM) chips. Flash chips are programmed (and re-programmed) in-circuit, while EPROM chips need to be removed from the motherboard for re-programming. BIOS versions are upgraded to take advantage of newer versions of hardware and to correct bugs in previous revisions of BIOSes. Beginning with the IBM AT, PCs supported a hardware clock settable through BIOS. It had a century bit which allowed for manually changing the century when the year 2000 happened. Most BIOS revisions created in 1995 and nearly all BIOS revisions in 1997 supported the year 2000 by setting the century bit automatically when the clock rolled past midnight, 31 December 1999. The first flash chips were attached to the ISA bus. Starting in 1998, the BIOS flash moved to the LPC bus, following a new standard implementation known as "firmware hub" (FWH). In 2005, the BIOS flash memory moved to the SPI bus. The size of the BIOS, and the capacity of the ROM, EEPROM, or other media it may be stored on, has increased over time as new features have been added to the code; BIOS versions now exist with sizes up to 32 megabytes. For contrast, the original IBM PC BIOS was contained in an 8 KB mask ROM. Some modern motherboards are including even bigger NAND flash memory ICs on board which are capable of storing whole compact operating systems, such as some Linux distributions. For example, some ASUS notebooks included Splashtop OS embedded into their NAND flash memory ICs. However, the idea of including an operating system along with BIOS in the ROM of a PC is not new; in the 1980s, Microsoft offered a ROM option for MS-DOS, and it was included in the ROMs of some PC clones such as the Tandy 1000 HX. Another type of firmware chip was found on the IBM PC AT and early compatibles. In the AT, the keyboard interface was controlled by a microcontroller with its own programmable memory. On the IBM AT, that was a 40-pin socketed device, while some manufacturers used an EPROM version of this chip which resembled an EPROM. This controller was also assigned the A20 gate function to manage memory above the one-megabyte range; occasionally an upgrade of this "keyboard BIOS" was necessary to take advantage of software that could use upper memory. The BIOS may contain components such as the Memory Reference Code (MRC), which is responsible for the memory initialization (e.g. SPD and memory timings initialization). Modern BIOS includes Intel Management Engine or AMD Platform Security Processor firmware.

Harvested Online Documentation & Reference Sources • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UEFI • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS